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Abstract
We derive new bounds for the price of anarchy under nonlinear and asymmetric costs. The
bounds depend on an additional factor called the intrinsic cost of the system and therefore
tend to be more accurate than the current bounds that are dependent only on the degree of
asymmetry of the Jacobian and the degree of the nonlinearity of the cost function.
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1 Introduction
Many problems in business operations can be modeled as Nash games. It is well known that the
solutions of a Nash game, i.e. the Nash equilibria may not be efficient from the system point
of view. The inefficiency of Nash equilibrium has been extensively studied in recent literature
[3, 4, 11, 16]. The phrase “the price of anarchy” is used by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [13]
to characterize the degree of efficiency loss, which is the ratio of the system’s cost at a Nash
equilibrium point and the overall optimal cost of the system optimization problem. Various worst
case bounds of the price of anarchy have been established for the system optimization problems
in which a Nash equilibrium point exists. Notable examples include the network equilibrium
problem, e.g., [2, 8, 16], the competitive multi-period pricing problem, e.g., [15], and the Nash
Cournot equilibria problem, e.g., [7].
Perakis [14] emphasized the importance of non-separable and asymmetric system cost in the
study of the price of anarchy and established bounds for linear and nonlinear nonseparable cost
functions, which depend on the degree of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. She
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also gave some examples to show that the bounds could be tight. The model under consideration
is as follows. Let the system optimization problem be
min x>F (x) subject to x ∈ K ⊂ Rn, (1)
where F : Rn → Rn is a continuously differentiable function and K is a nonempty, closed,
convex and bounded subset of Rn. Suppose that the Nash equilibrium points of the system are
characterized by the solution set of a variational inequality problem called the user optimization
problem
Find xu ∈ K such that F (xu)>(x − xu) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (2)
Let xu and xs denote solutions of the user and system optimization problems, respectively. Let
Zu = x
>
u F (xu) be the cost of the user-optimized problem and Zs = x
>
s F (xs) = min
x∈K
x>F (x) be
the cost of the system optimization problem, respectively. The target is to provide bounds for
Zu/Zs.
In this paper, we generalize the results of Perakis [14]. We show that the bounds depend on
not only the degree of asymmetry and the nonlinearity of the cost function, but also an intrinsic
property of the system, namely, the ratio between the minimum intrinsic cost and the maximum
intrinsic cost (defined later). The new bounds are not trivial in the sense that they are generally
more accurate than the old bounds and that if the above ratio reduces to zero, then the new
and old bounds become identical.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we prove our new bounds.
In Section 3, we give some examples to show that the new bounds can improve the current
bounds. The new bounds allow us to draw some interesting insights, which cannot be observed
using the bounds in [14]. Finally, we make some concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 New bounds
2.1 The linear case
We first consider the case that the cost function F is linear. That is, F (x) = Mx + q, where M
is an n × n, positive definite and possibly asymmetric matrix, and q>x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K.
In a similar way to [14], we characterize the degree of asymmetry of a matrix M using the
following constant.
Definition 2.1



















The constant c2 was originally introduced by Hammond [9] and has the following property:
Lemma 2.1 If M2 is a positive semidefinite matrix, then c2 ≤ 2.
The following theorem provides a new bound of the price of anarchy for the linear case.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that F (x) = Mx + q, M is positive definite and q>x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K.
Let xu be a solution of the user optimization problem (2) and let xs be a solution of the system



















if c2 ≥ 4
or c2 < 4 and c2d ≥ 1

















Proof. Since xu is a solution of the variational inequality problem (2) and xs ∈ K, we have












≤ ‖xs‖S‖x>u M>S−1‖S + q>xs
≤ ‖xu‖S‖S−1M‖S‖xs‖S + q>xs
= c‖xu‖S‖xs‖S + q>xs.
For any two vectors x and y in Rn, we have
‖x‖S‖y‖S ≤ b1‖x‖2S + b2‖y‖2S (4)
if b1, b2 ≥ 0 and b1b2 ≥ 14 . It follows that
Zu ≤ a1‖xu‖2S + a2‖xs‖2S + q>xs
= a1x
>
u Sxu + a2x
>










>xs) − a1q>xu − (a2 − 1)q>xs
= a1Zu + a2Zs − a1q>xu − (a2 − 1)q>xs, (5)
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where a1, a2 ≥ 0, and a1a2 ≥ c
2
4 . We consider the two cases, c
2 ≥ 4 and c2 < 4, separately.
For the first case, we can further select a2 ≥ 1 and a1 < 1 so that the last two terms in (5)










subject to a1a2 ≥ c2/4 (6)
a2 ≥ 1, 0 ≤ a1 < 1.
The solution is a1 = 1/2, a2 = c
2/2 and Zu/Zs ≤ c2, which is the same bound as that in [14].
We now discuss the second case. Let us define the maximum and minimum intrinsic costs
respectively by Csup := sup
x∈K
q>x and Cinf := inf
x∈K
q>x and impose the condition that 0 ≤ a1 < 1,
0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1. Then, if
a1Cinf + (a2 − 1)Csup ≥ 0,
we have
Zu ≤ a1Zu + a2Zs − a1Cinf − (a2 − 1)Csup
≤ a1Zu + a2Zs.




subject to a1a2 ≥ c2/4
a1Cinf + (a2 − 1)Csup ≥ 0 (7)
0 ≤ a1 < 1.
Let d := Cinf/Csup. If c




subject to a1a2 ≥ c2/4 (8)
0 ≤ a1 < 1.
The solution is a1 = 1/2, a2 = c
































≥ 1, we have solution a1 = 1/2, a2 = c2/2, and Zu/Zs ≤ c2.
Remark: In the above theorem, we have used the convention that 00 = 1; that is, when q = 0,
we have d = 1. For sup
x∈K































4 − c2 .





c2 if c2 ≥ 2
4
4−c2 otherwise,
which is the one obtained by Perakis [14].
For the separable affine functions where the matrix M is diagonal positive definite or non-
separable functions where M is symmetric positive definite, c2 = 1. Roughgaden and Tardos
[16] and Perakis [14] derive the bound 4/3 for the separable and nonseparable case, respectively.
They showed that the bound can be tight. We can see that our bound can also be tight, since
it is a generalization of that of Perakis. Furthermore, our new bounds can give some useful
information on the problem, using the quantity d. For example, when d = 1, that is, if the
intrinsic cost is a constant, then the bound is c2 and we have the following corollary.





Remark: The above corollary includes Corollary 2 in [14] as a special case, where the same
bound was derived for the case that q = 0. Furthermore, if c2 = 1, i.e., for the separable case or
the nonseparable symmetric case, the bound is 1. Hence, we have provided a sufficient condition
where there is no efficiency loss in the game.
2.2 The nonlinear case
In this section, we show that the results in the previous subsection can be extended to the
case of nonlinear and asymmetric cost functions. Here, the Jacobian matrix is not a constant
matrix M but a positive definite and asymmetric matrix ∇F (x). The positive-definiteness of
the Jacobian ∇F (x) and the boundedness of K ensure that the variational inequality problem
(2) has a unique solution [6].
To derive the bounds, we have to introduce two quantities for measuring the degree of
asymmetry and the nonlinearity, respectively. The following definition is from Definition 2 of
[14].
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Definition 2.2 The quantity c2 for the nonlinear function F , which measures the asymmetry







∇F (x) + ∇F (x)>
2
is the symmetrized part of the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x).
The following definition was first used in [12] and [17] in the analysis of interior point methods.
It finds new applications recently in the analysis of the price of anarchy [14].
Definition 2.3 The function F : Rn → Rn is said to satisfy the Jacobian similarity condition
if there exists κ ≥ 1 such that ∀w ∈ Rn, ∀x, x̄ ∈ K, there holds
κ−1w>∇F (x)w ≤ w>∇F (x̄)w ≤ κw>∇F (x)w.
Theorem 2.2 Suppose that F (x) satisfies the Jacobian similarity condition and that F (0)>x ≥













c2κ2 − 2(κ − 1) if c2 ≥ 4 or c2κ > 2;
c2 + 2 − 2
κ
if c2 ≤ 4, c2κ ≤ 2 and c2κ2d > 1;
c2 + 2 − 2
κ

















Proof. Since xu is a solution of the variational inequality problem (2) and xs ∈ K, using a similar




≤ x>s F (xu)
= x>s F (xs) + x
>
s (F (xu) − F (xs)).
Define
Φ(t) := F (xs + t(xu − xs))>xs, t ∈ [0, 1].
Then from the mean value theorem we have that there is some t̄ ∈ [0, 1] such that
Φ(1)− Φ(0) = Φ′(t̄)(1− 0),
i.e.,
(F (xu) − F (xs))>xs = (xu − xs)>∇F (x̄)>xs,
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where
x̄ = xs + t̄(xu − xs).
Thus,
Zu ≤ x>s F (xs) + x>s ∇F (x̄)(xu − xs)
= x>s F (xs) − x>s ∇F (x̄)xs + x>u ∇F (x̄)>S(x̄)−1S(x̄)xs
≤ x>s F (xs) − x>s ∇F (x̄)xs + ‖x>u ∇F (x̄)>S(x̄)−1‖S(x̄)‖xs‖S(x̄)
≤ x>s F (xs) − x>s ∇F (x̄)xs + ‖xu‖S(x̄)‖S(x̄)−1∇F (x̄)‖S(x̄)‖xs‖S(x̄)
≤ x>s F (xs) − x>s ∇F (x̄)xs + c‖xu‖S(x̄)‖xs‖S(x̄)
≤ x>s F (xs) − x>s ∇F (x̄)xs + a1‖xu‖2S(x̄) + a2‖xs‖S(x̄)
= x>s F (xs) + a1x
>
u ∇F (x̄)xu + (a2 − 1)x>s ∇F (x̄)xs, (10)
where the second inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the third one from the
norm inequality, the fourth one from (9), and the last one from (4) and a1a2 ≥ c
2
4 . Applying
again the mean value theorem to the functions
Φ1(t) := F (xu + t(0 − xu))>xu, t ∈ [0, 1],
and
Φ2(t) := F (xs + t(0 − xs))>xs, t ∈ [0, 1],
we claim that there are t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1], such that
(F (xu) − F (0))>(xu − 0) = x>u ∇F (x1)xu, where x1 = xu − t1xu, (11)
(F (xs) − F (0))>(xs − 0) = x>s ∇F (x2)xs, where x2 = xs − t2xs. (12)
We consider the two cases c2 ≥ 4 or c2κ > 2 and c2 < 4, c2κ < 2 separately.
Case 1: c2 ≥ 4 or c2κ > 2. For this case, we can further select that a2 ≥ 1 and a1 < 1.
The analysis is the same as that in [14] and we include it here just for completeness. It
follows from (10)-(12) that
Zu ≤ x>s F (xs) + a1κx>u ∇F (x1)xu + (a2 − 1)κx>s ∇F (x2)xs,
= x>s F (xs) + a1κx
>
u (F (xu) − F (0)) + (a2 − 1)κx>s (F (xs) − F (0)),
where the inequality follows from the Jacobian similarity. Using the assumption that
F (0)>x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K, we obtain from the above inequality that
(1 − a1κ)Zu ≤ [1 + (a2 − 1)κ]Zs.
Thus, we can obtain an upper bound by solving
minimize
1 + (a2 − 1)κ
1 − a1κ
subject to a1a2 ≥ c2/4 (13)
a2 ≥ 1, 0 ≤ a1 < κ−1.
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The solution is a1 =
1




≤ c2κ2 − 2(κ− 1).
Case 2: c2 < 4 and c2κ < 2. For this case, we further impose the condition that a2 ≤ 1.
It follows from (10)-(12), the fact that a2 ≤ 1 and the Jacobian similarity that




= x>s F (xs) + a1κx
>
u (F (xu)− F (0)) +
(a2 − 1)
κ
x>s (F (xs) − F (0)).
Now, define Csup := sup
x∈K
F (0)>x and Cinf := inf
x∈K
F (0)>x. Then, if
a1κCinf + (a2 − 1)κ−1Csup ≥ 0,
we have
Zu ≤ a1κZu +
[
1 + (a2 − 1)κ−1
]
Zs − a1κCinf − (a2 − 1)κ−1Csup
≤ a1κZu + [1 + (a2 − 1)κ−1]Zs.
Therefore, we can find an upper bound by solving
minimize
1 + (a2 − 1)/κ
1 − a1κ
subject to a1a2 ≥ c2/4
a1κCinf + (a2 − 1)κ−1Csup ≥ 0 (14)
0 ≤ a1 < κ−1.
Let d := Cinf/Csup. Problem (14) becomes
minimize
1 + (a2 − 1)/κ
1− a1κ
subject to a1a2 ≥ c2/4
a1κ
2d + (a2 − 1) ≥ 0 (15)
0 ≤ a1 < κ−1.
If c2κ2d > 1, then (15) has the solution a1 =
1




≤ c2 + 2 − 2κ−1.































≥ κ−1, we have solution a1 = 12κ , a2 = c2κ/2, and
Zu
Zs
≤ c2 + 2 − 2κ−1.
Remarks: Theorem 2.2 is a direct extension of Theorem 2.1. Note that if the cost function is
linear, i.e., F (x) = Mx + q, then κ = 1. In this case, the bounds in Theorem 2.2 reduce exactly
to those in Theorem 2.1. If sup
x∈K
F (0)>x = ∞ then d = 0 and the bound reduces to that of [14]
for the nonlinear case.
3 Examples in traffic equilibrium
From the above section, we can see that for the case that c2 > 4, the bounds presented here are
the same as those derived in [14]. The difference arises in the case when c2 ≤ 4. In this case,
instead of the constraint that a2 ≥ 1, we use
a1Cinf + (a2 − 1)Csup ≥ 0
for the linear case and
a1κCinf + (a2 − 1)κ−1Csup ≥ 0,
for the nonlinear case, in the optimization problem to derive the bound. The feasible region
in these optimization problems can be larger than that in [14] and thus the bounds cannot be
worse than those in [14]. Figure 1 shows the situation, where c2 = 1.3, Csup = 2 and Cinf = 0.8.
Our work adds another dimension to the problem discussed by Perakis, incorporating the
effects from d (the intrinsic cost) and c (degree of asymmetry of matrix M). We present some
insights using some simple examples. Figure 2 plots the new bound and the bound from Perakis
[14] (the old bound for short) as functions of d with fixed c2 = 1.3, and Figure 3 plots the new
bound and the old bound as functions of c with fixed d = 0.8, respectively. In both figures we
set κ = 1.
From the two figures we can see that the new bound is not worse than that of [14] and in
some cases, it can be better. In Figure 2, at d = 0 (by convention, we have infinite max intrinsic
cost), the two bounds are the same. However, as the max intrinsic cost increases, the bound gets
better. An explanation to this phenomenon is that lowering the max intrinsic cost will imply
that the max cost of the inefficiency of the user is not heavily penalized. Thus the user tends to
make near-sighted decisions, which results in a smaller value for the ratio Zu/Zs. We are able
to capture this characteristic from our analysis.
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Figure 1: An illustrative figure: The feasible region of the optimization problem in [14] is the
intersection of 0 ≤ a1 < 1, a2 ≥ 1, and a1a2 ≥ c2/4; while our feasible region is the intersection
of 0 ≤ a1 < 1, 0.8a1 + a2 ≥ 1, and a1a2 ≥ c2/4. It is clear that our region is larger than that of
[14], as shown by the shadowed part.
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Figure 2: The bound as a function of d with fixed c.
















Figure 3: The bound as a function of c with fixed d.
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Figure 3 suggests that having a low degree of asymmetry leads to a low ratio of Zu/Zs. This
can be verified by both bounds. However, it is clear that our bound is more sensitive than the
old bound when c is small (c < 1.4).
We now present some examples to illustrate our results.
Example 1. The following figure is the original example from Braess’s paradox where there
are 4 nodes, 5 links, an origin-destination pair from node 1 to node 4 and the demand between
this O-D pair is 6. There are 3 paths from node 1 to node 4: the first one is through links a
and c; the second one is through links b and d; and the last one is through a, e, and d. Let
x = (x1, x2, x3)






c1 = 11x1 + 12x3 + 50,
c2 = 11x2 + 12x3 + 50,
c3 = 8x1 + 8x2 + 21x3 + 10.

























































Figure 4. The Braess Network in Example 1






















and the total costs are



















where S = (M + M>)/2, we can calculate that c2 = 1.2581. The feasible set K is
K := {x ∈ R3, x ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 6}.
The minimum intrinsic cost is infx∈K q>x = 60 and the maximum intrinsic cost is supx∈K q
>x =
300. Consequently, d = 0.2. The bound from [14] is
4
(4− c2) = 1.4588,









Example 2. Consider the network in Example 1 but with a different cost function. The purpose
of this example is to show that in practice, the bound may really rely on the constant d and






c1 = 11x1 + 12x3 + 32,
c2 = 11x2 + 12x3 + 32,













































and the total costs are












We have derived new bounds for efficiency loss in a model where the Nash equilibrium can be
characterized by a variational inequality and the system objective function is of the form x>F (x).
We focus on deriving an upper bound for the ratio Zu/Zs. We introduced a ratio d, which is
the ratio between the minimum and the maximum intrinsic costs. We extended the results
of Perakis and show that the bound for Zu/Zs depends on d. When d reduces to one, which
corresponds to the linear and symmetric systems, there is no loss of efficiency. Our numerical
results suggest that the ratio d plays an important role in determining the ratio Zs/Zu. We
provide some insights regarding the intrinsic cost, which appears to be new to the literature. A
potential application of this notion could be in the design of strategies for improving the user’s
solution; e.g., setting the toll price in a congested traffic networks [1, 10]. Furthermore, the
numerical results also show that the new bounds are more accurate especially when the degree
of asymmetry of the matrix is small.
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